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USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

PUBLISHING HISTORY OF 'VOYENNNY VESTNIK' OUTLINED

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 5, May 81 (signed to press 10 Apr 81) p 35

[Article by Ivan Skorodumov, editor-in-chief of the journal VOYENNNY VESTNIK and major general of tank troops: "Friend of the Officer"]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense journal VOYENNNY VESTNIK is one of the oldest periodicals in the Soviet Armed Forces. The first issue was published in May 1921. The Higher Editorial Council under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic began publishing the journal.

Those were difficult times. In the lead article that opened the journal, "Our Missions," it was stated briefly but persuasively, that: "Our republic bought its respite at the cost of blood. But we are still far from a full rest. Severe devastation is eating the country away; the country is surrounded by powerful plunderers. The mission of the day is to restore the economy and strengthen the country's defense with the help of the small, but well-trained and well-knit, army. In the cause of building the military, the mission of the day is to properly organize military training of both the Red Army and its command personnel."

In this same article, it was especially stressed that "VOYENNNY VESTNIK has set itself the task of popularizing all current questions of building the military in light of the experience of the entire recent military epoch, having as its main aim to help the command personnel of the Red Army and all the workers of the Red Army in the cause of military self-education and systematic military training of the entire Army of the Revolution."

Since the first issue, the journal has strived to work out the questions consistently and purposefully of educating warriors in the spirit of selfless devotion to the homeland and the Communist Party. In publishing qualified material on troop and command training, VOYENNNY VESTNIK renders effective assistance in raising the military knowledge and methodological skills of officers. In noting the journal's second anniversary, PRAVDA wrote that it had become the "source of class formulation of command personnel and their press organ that enjoys deserved love."

The rapid formation and further strengthening of the Journal's prestige was facilitated by its collective being able to quickly put together a large group of active authors made up of renowned military chiefs, experienced commanders and political workers. VOYENNNY VESTNIK quickly won the recognition of readers.

In April 1924, the journal's editorial board was headed by M. Frunze who within a short time published in the journal several works on military theory that were later put into a collection of his works. Members of the editorial board and authors of articles in various years were K. Voroshilov, M. Tukhachevskiy, A. Bubnov, A. Yegorov, I. Yakir, I. Uborevich, S. Budennyi, B. Shaposhnikov, D. Karbyshev and others.

The journal became a true training manual for new commanders advanced by the party to military work and who underwent seasoning in battles against the White Guards and interventionists. It contributed to the elaboration of theory of the deep battle and operation and to the improvement of tactics of unit and subunit operations.

In the articles published in the journal, the story of the combat experience of the Red Army was told, military traditions were propagandized, and questions associated with military and patriotic education of warriors and youth were extensively elucidated.

In the early months of the Great Patriotic War, when our army waged intense defensive battles, VOYENNY VESTNIK published articles from the fronts on fighting against tanks and air assaults, on organization of coordination of the various arms, on bold operations in the enemy's rear area, and on the courage and heroism of fighters and commanders. The situation changed and the nature of the journal's issues changed too. It regularly printed articles generalizing the experience of offensive combat, the practice of forcing water obstacles and the operations of assault units in inhabited localities. In many articles, the story was told of the mass heroism of Soviet warriors and the performance by them of their international duty.

The journal's authors during the war years were, as a rule, frontline men, generals and officers who participated directly in the battles.

During the postwar years, VOYENNY VESTNIK, which included editions such as "Tanker," "Artillery Journal," "Military Engineering Journal" and "Military Communicator," gained ever greater popularity among readers. It became the main press organ elucidating topical questions of theory and practice of modern combined-arms combat. Elaborated on its pages are new tactics, the experience of organizing unit and subunit coordination is generalized, and the problems of raising the effectiveness of combat employment of equipment and weaponry are discussed.

In the section "People, Feats, Reflections" which enjoys popularity with readers, the experience of the Great Patriotic War has been purposefully propagandized for many years. Writing under this rubric, as a rule, are former frontline men. In specific examples, they disclose the essence of the tactics that ensured victories in the battles, and they tell of the courage and heroism of fighters and commanders. These publications help today's commanders improve their tactical training, develop creative thinking, create a complicated situation in exercises, and teach subunits and units all that they have to know and be able to do in real combat.

The role of VOYENNY VESTNIK in the elucidation and propaganda of everything topical and advanced from military practice is continually growing. This is largely facilitated by the painstaking work of the editorial board, which includes well-known military leaders such as Army General D. Lelyushenko and Colonel General D. Dragunskiy, both awarded Hero of the Soviet Union twice, and Heroes of the Soviet

Union, Colonel General K. Provalov, Colonel General V. Merimskiy, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops P. Gudzh', professor and doctor of military science, and others. And among the journal's associates, one can encounter those who until recently were commanders of a regiment or battalion. Much that is useful in the content and formation of the journal was and is being contributed by these veterans of the editorial board and participants in the war: Ye. Golovkina, V. Ivanov, L. Kozlovskiy and V. Nesterov. Working fruitfully together with them are the experienced journalists I. Dynin, A. Yermakov, V. Kalinin, M. Kiryukhin, Yu. Protasov, A. Sedykh and B. Shubin.

In solving complex problems, the journal now too is helping officers of all arms work out scientifically substantiated methods of training and education of soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers. It profoundly elucidates theory and practice of modern combined-arms combat taking into account the fundamental changes that have occurred in operation art and tactics in connection with the revolution in military affairs, and familiarizes readers with the experience of the fraternal armies of the socialist community countries, and with the organization, weaponry, combat equipment and tactics of the armies of the capitalist countries.

The editorial collective considers its major mission propaganda of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the positions and conclusions contained in the works and speeches of comrade L. I. Brezhnev, publication of articles disclosing the growing role of the party in developing Soviet socialist society, in educating workers and warriors in the spirit of high communist ideology and proletarian internationalism, strengthening the combat community of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries and exposing bourgeois falsifiers of the history of World War II.

The journal strives to actively support and propagate everything new in military science and the practice of training and education of Soviet warriors, and champions raising combat readiness and the state of troop field training and strengthening military discipline and the state of organization.

The journal has done great work over the 60 years. It has become a major aid for raising tactical and fire expertise of warriors of the ground and air assault troops, a conduit of advanced techniques, and an active assistant to commanders in executing the complex missions of training and education of subordinates.

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ARMED FORCES

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES: BOOK REVIEWED

Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 2, 1981 (signed to press 23 Jan 81) pp 139-143

[Review by Colonel V. Kazarinov, honored worker of culture of the RSFSR, of book "Vooruzhennyye Sily razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva" [Armed Forces of the Developed Socialist Society] by K. A. Vorob'yev, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1980, 207 pages]

[Text] The book being reviewed (Vorob'yev, K. A., "Armed Forces of the Developed Socialist Society," a sociopolitical essay, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1980, 207 pages) is devoted to a study of the dependency of development of our Armed Forces on the socio-economic progress of Soviet society and to a description of their social makeup and purpose.

It must be said that the questions concerning the sociopolitical essence, purpose and function of the armed forces in the mature socialist society have been analyzed previously in the literature too. They, in particular, were elucidated in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1976-1980), in the books "Partiya i armiya" [The Party and the Armed Forces] (Politizdat, Moscow, 1980), "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces] (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1980), "KPSS--organizator zashchity sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [The CPSU--Organizer of the Defense of the Socialist Homeland] (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1977) and other publications. The book being reviewed may be considered a definite contribution to the further elaboration of this topic.

First of all, I want to call the reader's attention to the well-known position maintained in the book that the USSR Armed Forces since the moment of their inception have been and remain a qualitatively new type of military organization. While all previous armies have played and play the role of the tool of force in the hands of the exploiting classes, and have served and serve antipopular purposes, the army of the land of the soviets was created and exists as the defender of the working people, serving their interests.

Against the historical background of the great gains of socialism, in the book the author traces the process of development and improvement of the Soviet Army and Navy which embody the characteristic features of Soviet society and which are built and function in conformity with its objective laws and sociopolitical system.

The Communist Party, in guiding the construction of the new society and consistently championing the cause of detente and international cooperation, at the same time

takes all steps to see that the combat might of the armed forces is at the level that guarantees the reliable defense of our homeland and peace throughout the world. It scientifically works out a unified military engineering policy and based on it with the support of all the people ensures the systematic, continuous supply of the Armed Forces with the most modern types of weapons and combat equipment and stockpiling of strategic reserves and material stores in case of war. "...Our party," it was noted in the summary report of the Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress, "will do everything to see that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union will have in the future too all the necessary means to execute their critical mission of being the guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of universal peace."

The sociopolitical advantages of socialism are of great value to raising the country's defensive capability and strengthening the armed forces. The moral, political and social unity of the developed socialist society, the strengthening of its political system, the affirmation of real, full and equal rights of the people, and the creation of conditions for harmonious development of the personality ensure the high level of organization of the Armed Forces, their monolithic solidarity with the people and the invincibility of personnel morale.

Discussed in the book is the development, characteristic only for socialist armed forces, and the change of their functions as the new society progresses. With the victory of socialism in the USSR, the army began losing its function of suppressing the harmful class forces within the country. And in the stage of mature socialism, the need for this function for our armed forces has completely disappeared since the social, political and ideological unity of the entire Soviet society has been established and the new historical community of people—the Soviet nation—has arisen. Our Armed Forces have become common with the nation [obshchenarodnyy].

It should be noted that variant readings are allowed in the interpretation of this question in the book. Thus, in the second chapter, there is the statement that the Soviet Armed Forces assume the common national character back in the stage of overcoming the class antagonisms in our country: "With the liquidation of the remnants of the exploiting classes, the army of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is transformed into an army common with the nation..." (p 51). But at the end of the book, the author in conformity with the generally accepted point of view writes: "Above all, in the developed socialist society, the army becomes common with the nation" (p 206). Evidently, in the first case, it should read that the elimination of class antagonisms marked the beginning of the process of essential change in the social makeup of the army.

The external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has been modified in content and expanded too. Aimed exclusively at defending socialism from imperialist aggression and at securing peaceful conditions to build communism, it is purely defensive in nature, expresses the peace-loving essence of the socialist state, and meets the interests of the working masses and the progressive community of the entire world. Wars are alien to socialism, it is stressed in the book; they do not stem from the internal laws of its development. "We threaten no one," L. I. Brezhnev said in his speech to the sailors of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. "Talk of the so-called 'Soviet threat' is the barefaced lie by the enemies of detente, and nothing else. We are improving our defense for the sole purpose of reliably defending the gains of Great October and firmly protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, our friends and allies."

The socialist community countries keep vigilant watch over the military preparations and aggressive schemes of imperialism which have been especially intensified recently. U.S. reactionary military circles to please the military industrial complex have stepped up the arms race anew and are demanding ever more destructive types of weapons. The danger of war in our time has significantly increased since the hegemonic, anti-Soviet policy of the Maoist leadership of China has closed with the aggressive policy of the imperialists. Under these conditions, the external function of the socialist army and its constant combat readiness assume special importance.

Among the basic directions of the Soviet Armed Forces carrying out their external function, the author discusses, first, maintaining the security of the Soviet state and the peaceful creative labor of our people, and second, together with the other fraternal armies, maintaining the security of the entire community of socialist countries. In addition, our Armed Forces, just as the armies of the other socialist countries, serve as a mighty barrier to imperialist intervention in the affairs of states liberated from the colonial and social yoke or fighting foreign dominance. Also assuming ever greater importance is the functional mission of the socialist armies, primarily of the USSR Armed Forces, to prevent another world war and to foil the aggressive plans of international imperialism.

In conformity with this and as a function of the conditions specifically taking shape, it is said in the work under review, the external function of the socialist army may be carried out in various forms: in the form of a just, revolutionary war to defend the socialist homeland and all world socialism; in the "potential" form--the very fact of the existence of the armed forces of the socialist states, their might and high combat readiness prevent imperialists from carrying out aggressive plans against the socialist countries; in the form of rendering, under the appropriate agreements, assistance to nations of countries being liberated from imperialist dependence in building their national armies, etc.

In bringing out the fundamental differences between the Soviet and the capitalist armed forces, along with indisputable positions, the author expresses those that one can hardly agree with. For example, in need of clarification is the idea that "an army's type is manifested in the way it carries out its functions" (p 44). The basis for the typology of an army should obviously be not the method of its operations, but their direction, elucidating against whom and in the interests of what class they are being carried out.

I think what is interesting in the book is the comprehensive analysis of the social role of the Armed Forces within our society, the characteristics of the features of the personality, the moral-political and combat qualities of the Soviet warrior, and the judgments on the conditions, ways and means of forming these qualities. The book sections covering these questions are full of facts and figures drawn from the life of the armed forces, the practice of training and educating servicemen, the experience of party and political work, and from sociological research.

Thus, in telling of the participation of armed service personnel in the political life of the country and in solving particular national economic problems, the author cites examples of the active work of servicemen in party and soviet agencies, their selfless labor in constructing the BAM [Baykal-Amur Railroad], liquidating the consequences of natural disasters, etc.

The army's social role in the developed socialist society, it is stressed in the book, is graphically manifested also in the great educational effect that military service has on Soviet youth. It is noteworthy that in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Further Improvement of the Ideological and Politicoeducational Work," there is the requirement "to carry out measures aimed at further intensification of the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. To multiply the glorious traditions of the armed forces, the service in which is an outstanding school of labor and military skill, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship."

In contrast to the personnel of the capitalist armies, drilled in the spirit of hostility to workers, the warrior of the socialist armed forces is reared as a true patriot of his homeland and a defender of the people's interests as a warrior-internationalist. A remarkable feature of Soviet servicemen, as also noted in the book, is that they stand out not just as an armed force, but also as a political and ideological force. After entering the labor collectives upon demobilization, former warriors, as a rule, advance among the leaders and are noted for their political maturity and discipline. Stationed because of necessity beyond the borders of our homeland, the Soviet warrior always highly bears the honor of a political representative of the country where socialism triumphed.

Among the most characteristic features of the personality of the warrior of the socialist armed forces, the author reveals the following: integrity of class interests, high civil dignity, collectivism and humanism. Being, as it were, a copy of the typical characteristics of our society, these traits are continually evolving under the effect of social transformations. Further improvement of the mature socialist society raises in conformity to law the quality too of the personnel in our Armed Forces. Confirming this, the author cites persuasive data on the growth in the general educational and technical level of draftees, the fruitful contribution of the DOSAAF organizations in preparing them for military service, and on the steady increase in the ideological-political maturity, professional and methodological knowledge and skills of the officer cadres. For example, in the Strategic Missile Forces, more than 90 percent of the officers are rated specialists and true experts in their job.

Typical too is the indicator reflecting the growth in political maturity of the warriors in the Soviet Army and Navy: in 1979, about 90 percent were communists and Komsomol members. They are a reliable support to the commanders and political workers in training and educating subordinates and in executing the critical missions facing the warriors.

The major principle of development of the Armed Forces and the basis of the principles of building the military is the guidance of this process by the CPSU. And it is quite right that a special chapter was devoted to this question in the book. Shown in it are the basic principles for effecting the guiding role by our party in the sphere of defense, namely: unity of political and military leadership, centralism, training, education and assignment of military cadres, and intensifying the influence of the political agencies and party organizations in the units and on the ships. The CPSU works out military policy, determines the path for strengthening the country's defensive capability, and solves current problems of military theory and practice and building of the Armed Forces. The decrees of the CPSU congresses and Central Committee Plenums and other party documents are the basis for all measures taken by party and state agencies, mass social organizations of the

workers, and organs of military control to strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces and raise their combat readiness.

In the contemporary stage, the author stresses, there is a steady increase in the guiding role of the party and in the authority and influence of party organizations on all aspects of building the military and of the life and activity of the Armed Forces. This is due first of all to objective factors common for mature socialism, but also to special circumstances associated with the specific nature of the evolution and functioning of the Armed Forces. Included in the latter in the book are: in connection with the threat of nuclear missile conflict, the growing importance of working out scientific views on the nature of possible war; the necessity of correct assessment of the correlation of class forces in the international arena, profound and precise analysis of the world military-political and military-strategic situation; the complication of building the military under the conditions of scientific and technical progress; intensification of the role of the moral factor in modern war, and consequently, the moral, political and psychological training of the warriors; the necessity of further strengthening of building the military of the socialist states and the combat community of their armies.

It is clear that such problems can be solved only by the party, equipped with the truly scientific, Marxist-Leninist doctrine, having great experience in ideological, political and organizational work, and enjoying the boundless trust and authority among the people.

Discussed in the book, although concisely, is the role of the ideological-educational activity of command personnel, political agencies and party organizations in the Armed Forces. The author stresses that ideological, party and political work is a weapon of a special sort. It penetrates the whole life and service of the personnel, has a complex nature, and is organically linked to combat training, strengthening of military discipline, and further strengthening of the constant combat readiness of the units and ships.

In conclusion, let us note that this book can be recommended to propagandists and students of the system of party education studying the problems of building the military and to all interested in the history and contemporary life of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

NEW TANK SIMULATOR--Central Group of Forces--"N" unit's rationalizers are doing a lot to improve the quality of the subunits' training process. Under the leadership of Lt Col A. Moshkovtsev, a simulator was created to help tank gunners and commanders, as well as gunner-operators of infantry fighting vehicles, to improve their practical skills. With this simulator, the exercise director can create different target configurations thereby presenting each student or crew with different situations. When using the simulator, those firing can master reconnaissance and observation of targets, determination of target distance, and the sequence of target selection for firing. Use of the display panel permits evaluation of the student's performance. The instructor can direct the subunit's firing. Very important as well as is that use of the simulator helps to conserve ammunition and automotive supplies. Major N. Malyy.
[Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 81 p 2]

CSO: 1801/300

ARMED FORCES

ERRATUM: LAW ON UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE: REVISED VERSION

In JPRS 78407 of 29 June 1981, No 1600 of this series, the following corrections should be made in the item entitled "Law on Universal Military Service: Revised Edition," which begins on page nine:

On page 23, Article 50 was inadvertently omitted. It reads: Article 50. Reservists in the reserve of the first class of the second category, during the time they are in the reserve of the first class, are called up for training courses up to six times for periods of up to 3 months each.

On page 31, in the first paragraph of Article 94, "intentional" should replace "international" so that the paragraph reads: Article 94. Reservists and draftees can be fined up to 10 rubles for violating the military registrations rules established by Articles 89-92, for failure to report upon summons to the military commissariat without valid reasons, for intentional damage to or inadequate safe-keeping of military service cards (special certificates) leading to their loss, as well as for delaying informing the registration office about a change in the address of place of residence. This penalty is imposed according to administrative procedures by the rayon (city) military commissar.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

LIGHT CONCEALMENT METHODS DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 81 (signed to press 9 Apr 81) pp 34-35

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Ye. Mikhno: "Under Blackout Conditions"]

[Text] In the event that the enemy employs conventional weapons, blackouts would be in effect for the entire period of combat operations. Consequently the rescue and immediate emergency reconstruction work (SNAVR) at night must be carried out considering the requirements of the established conditions, that is, partial or complete darkness depending upon the conditions. In the first instance the overall level of illumination is reduced to a minimum of 2-4 lux ensuring productive activities and transport traffic.

Under the conditions of total darkness, outside illumination is fully turned off. For this reason it is essential to utilize illuminated markers and employ white and luminescent (glowing) colors for marking roadways, turning points, driveways, entrances into shelters, for the indicators of the tops of fire hydrants, exits and markers for passageways, the outlines of stairwells and fences. And the color, shape and inscription of the markers should be distinguishable from a distance of at least 10 m. The illumination in their location should not exceed 0.2 lux from the outside and 0.5 lux on the inside of the building. If work is being carried out inside and there are no mechanical blackout devices (shutters, blinds and so forth), interior general or local blackout illumination can be employed.

General blackout lighting is used to illuminate work areas using equipment adapted in accord with the blackout requirement. However, in wartime this is used only in individual instances in small areas where SNAVR is being carried out. For this purpose it is possible to use the exterior and interior lights (Fig. 1a) with blackout attachments (Fig. 1b). It is also possible to use, although in truth only under partial blackout conditions, the floodlights of the PZ-35 and PZ-45 type equipped with blackout attachments made from roofing iron. Their interior surface is painted a dull black while the outside is painted the same color as the floodlight. The floodlights are positioned only horizontally or facing slightly downwards. They are fastened to special metal disassemblable poles or temporary wooden supports at a height of at least 4 m and in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of accidentally directing the light beam upwards. The size of the illuminated surface from the PZ-35 floodlights with a blackout attachment equals 50-75 m². The superimposing of the illuminated areas one on top of the other is not allowed as otherwise the blackout standards would be violated.




Fig. 1. Blackout lights:

a--Interior illumination light; b--Blackout attachment in the form of a light screen; c--Forehead mining light with blackout attachment: 1--Battery, 2--Switch, 3--Cord, 4--Light, 5--Bulb, 6--Louvers, 7--Hook; d--Device for illuminating horizontal surfaces; e--Device for illuminating vertical surfaces; f--Kerosene lantern with blackout louvers; g--Blackout signal lights.

Local blackout lighting is provided by equipping machines and mechanisms with headlights and lights as well as by using light portable lights on metal tripods with blackout attachments. In wartime such illumination is the basis of the light support for SNAVR.

For illuminating work inside buildings, lights are used with deeply recessed bulbs and portable lights powered from the regular current networks. In individual instances it is possible to use electric and kerosene portable lanterns which have louvers and the light spot of which does not exceed 1 m^2 .

The most suitable type of light for rescue work involving the building of passageways through rubble is the forehead battery-operated mining light (Fig. 1c) which is powered over a flexible cord from a battery fastened to the waist of the rescue worker. Consequently, his hands remain free. The light can be blacked out by using louvers.

In open areas in carrying out SNAVR the need arises to illuminate horizontal and vertical surfaces. For illuminating horizontal surfaces, a device is used consisting of a metal stand, the holder of the light and an incandescent bulb (Fig. 1d). Its overall height is 3 m. The light can be a metal or cardboard shade at a protective angle of at least 27° or a mirror device.

The unit for illuminating a vertical surface (Fig. 1e) consists of a metal stand up to 6 m tall, a holder, a headlight and a blackout attachment which is a sheet-metal disc with a trapezoid slot and a screening baffle.

All the lights should be concentrated on a special motor vehicle. In the driver's cab is the distribution panel to which the lights are connected. The panel can be connected to the lighting network or to the motor vehicle's storage battery. As the experience of exercises has shown, many blackout devices, in addition to the regulation, can easily be made in the enterprise shops.

In carrying out the SNAVR, under the particular and complete blackout conditions, special attention must be paid to blacking out the operation of vehicles and mechanisms. Their use at night is possible only with good illumination and the required signal system. The lighting equipment of cranes, bulldozers and excavators should ensure the minimally necessary sizes of the light spots for work with even brightness and the least number of them in the area as well as illumination for the controls of the machine.

The lighting devices mounted on machines can be of two types: near and distant action. The near action devices are located close to the working parts and are used to create the necessary light spots ensuring their visibility (the bulldozer blade, the excavator shovel and so forth). The distant operation devices are used for orienting the operators on the terrain, creating light spots 10-20 m ahead of the machine. For close action it is best to use the serially produced motor vehicle marker lights (parking lights) onto which protective baffles can be put or diaphragms from lightproof material inserted, and so forth. For long range it is possible to use tractor and equipment headlights with blackout attachments (Fig. 2) from the set of blackout equipment (SMU).




Fig. 2. Motor vehicle headlights with blackout attachment of the SMU set.

The SMU set ensures the blacking out of all the illuminated instruments and lights of motor vehicles and equipment (headlights, rear lights, parking lights and dome lights) using special attachments, inserts and switches. The attachment for the front headlights has a baffle and slots which can be closed by a top for traveling under partial and complete blackout conditions.

Traffic safety is significantly improved under blackout conditions if the overall dimensions of the vehicles are marked by cat's eye or by white paint on the bumpers, the edges of the fenders and sides of the vehicle or in suspending on the back special illuminated screens or by lighting under the vehicle.

The designated devices should be prepared beforehand by one's own forces in the shops of the enterprise in the course of carrying out measures to increase continued operations and stored along with the supplies of auxiliary materials.

In conducting nighttime SNAVR one should be concerned first of all with illuminating the areas for opening up the shelters, pulling down rubble, building passageways,

demolishing or shoring up damaged structures of buildings and installations which threaten to collapse, for setting out illuminated indicators for traffic direction, passageways, the places for loading wounded and their evacuation routes. Signals with a red light should be set out in the most dangerous areas. All the personnel of the formations engaged in searching for injured and giving them medical first aid must be provided with individual lights.

Obviously it is superfluous to emphasize that the best trained formations should work in the strike areas under such complicated conditions. We should point out that a difficult situation requires additional men and equipment for even in daytime labor productivity is noticeably reduced in working in a gas mask.

The reduction in productivity in carrying out SNAVR under blackout conditions can also be judged from the approximate data of the table of correction factors for the standard required men and equipment:

Illumination	Correction Factors
Blackout illumination under complete blackout conditions:	
to 5 lux	1.2-1.3
to 2 lux	1.3-1.4
to 0.2 lux	1.4-1.5
Incomplete natural illumination (dusk, moonlight)	1.6-1.8

Thus, the success of preparing the Civil Defense formations and units for nighttime operations will depend largely upon the able organization and conducting of exercises, drills and training sessions in the training compounds and fields at any time of the day with a constant further complicating of the situation. Nighttime work requires from the personnel special experience and skills and a great straining of physical and moral forces.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

VIEWS ON DISARMAMENT, DETENTE DISCUSSED

Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 5, May 81 (signed to press 23 Apr 81) pp 39-48

[Article by V. Petrovskiy: "Soviet Initiatives--A Guidepost on the Path toward Curbing the Arms Race"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Long live the peace-loving Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union!

Let the initiatives put forward by the 26th CPSU Congress directed toward strengthening peace and national security be brought to full fruition!

From the appeals of the CPSU Central Committee

Because it considers an effort to prevent war to constitute the task of tasks of its foreign policy, the Soviet Union has been unfailing in pointing to concrete guideposts oriented toward curbing the arms race and achieving real disarmament. The congresses of the party and the plenums and Politburo of the Central Committee are the generators of new ideas and proposals. The peace program proclaimed by the 24th and 25th Congresses and further elaborated by the 26th CPSU Congress provides a reliable compass in the struggle to eliminate the threat of war and check the arms race. "A key direction of the foreign-policy effort of the party and the government," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared from the platform of the 26th CPSU Congress, "has been and remains the struggle to reduce the threat of war and curb the arms race."

The Soviet Union has always been found in the vanguard of the effort to limit armaments and to redirect that effort toward the achievement of real disarmament. Over the past 35 years it has put forward more than 120 proposals on key questions concerning the strengthening of international security and curbing the arms race alone. "Indeed," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has observed, "there is no country which in recent years would have come before all mankind with such a broad range of concrete and realistic initiatives concerning the most important problems of international relations as has the Soviet Union." While introducing new proposals for disarmament and limiting the arms race, the Soviet Union at the same time considers it necessary that ongoing political processes preserve what has already been accomplished through joint efforts so as to maintain the continuity of new ideas along with those advanced previously.

The proposals our country has put forward in recent years taken together constitute a comprehensive program for limiting and halting entirely any further quantitative and qualitative increases in armaments and armed forces, primarily those of countries possessing great military potential. This program, which proposes specific steps in all

areas, is distinguished by its realism, careful balance and constructiveness. Soviet proposals do not one iota disturb the present relationship of forces, so that with their realization no one would lose; on the contrary, all would gain in equal measure--countries which are major military powers as well as those which are not.

The 26th CPSU Congress reiterated that Soviet proposals for strengthening international security and limiting the arms race still hold good and at the same time put forward new initiatives in this direction concerning the most urgent, burning problems of international life. "...The new measures we have proposed," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared at the 26th CPSU Congress, "encompass a broad range of issues. They concern both nuclear missiles and conventional weapons and ground, naval and air forces. They touch upon the situation in Europe and in the Near, Middle and Far East. They include measures both political and military in nature. One single goal unifies all these proposals, our one common desire--and that is to do everything possible to remove the peoples from under the threat of nuclear war and to preserve peace on Earth."

Advancing in a single front with the Soviet Union in the struggle for arms limitation and a redirection of efforts toward real disarmament are the countries of the socialist commonwealth. The conferences of the Political Consultative Committee and meetings of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states and conversations between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and leaders of the fraternal socialist countries are important guideposts on the path toward closer cooperation in pursuit of a consistent line on curbing and holding back the arms race. Proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provide points of support for the nonaligned movement and broad groups in society in capitalist countries.

In coming out with their peaceloving initiatives, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are far from claiming any monopoly in this area. On the contrary, they would point to the importance of the contribution of all governments and peoples to the cause of detente and disarmament and continually stress their readiness to look at all ideas put forward on this score. But if nevertheless many of the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union and the socialist and aligned countries remain unrealized despite their approval by the majority of countries of the world, the blame for this lies upon those imperialist and hegemonist forces which have made the stockpiling of weapons a profitable business and the primary substance and design of their policy.

Remove the Nuclear Threat

Occupying a central place among the Soviet Union's constructive proposals, which have as their objective the ridding of mankind of the threat of nuclear war, is a /series of measures directed toward halting and then reversing the nuclear arms race/, abolishing and dismantling means of waging nuclear war and at the same time toward renunciation of the use of force in international relations. The importance of these measures is obvious. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger for mankind in our day.

According to estimates widely circulating in the West, the number of nuclear warheads of all types now totals some 50,000. Their total yield is calculated at 15 million kilotons of TNT, that is, a million times greater than the yield of a Hiroshima-type bomb, which took 240,000 human lives. But nuclear weapons continue to be stockpiled despite this. US military plans call for a steady increase in the number of nuclear warheads and means of delivery, further increases in their destructive force and their siting in more and more different locations. This fact in itself intensifies the threat of their use. But this is not the extent of the danger. The fact is that newer, more

dangerous types of nuclear weapons are being developed which to an ever decreasing extent would lend themselves to mutual monitoring and, accordingly, to their agreed-upon limitation. Moreover, the nuclear arms buildup is being accompanied in the US by a shift in military-political thinking, which is now emphasizing preventive nuclear strikes and the waging of nuclear war with the employment of increasingly sophisticated and precision-guided weapons.

Now on the agenda of international negotiations is the Soviet Union's proposal for a radical solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. The 26th CPSU Congress called attention to this proposal once again. The point here is not simply a ban on nuclear weapons, but their complete elimination from national arsenals and a changeover to the use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes.

This problem is extraordinarily complex, including when looked at from the purely technical point of view. It is important, however, at least to begin to make some practical headway. So proceeding on this basis, the Soviet Union in 1978 put forward a proposal for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of reserves until they have been entirely, "100 per cent," destroyed. Parallel to the process of limiting nuclear weapons it calls for steps to be taken to strengthen political and international legal national security guarantees, by, among other things, the conclusion of a Universal Treaty of Renunciation of the Use of Force in International Relations. This would create a situation in which a reduction of nuclear weapons would not adversely affect the security of a single country.

Task number one is now immediately to begin consultations to the end of preparing practical negotiations on this issue. A worsening of the international situation not only does not remove this important task from the agenda, but on the contrary makes it even more urgent and necessary. There are thus entirely sufficient reasons for beginning these negotiations immediately. Only one thing is lacking--political will on the part of four of the five nuclear countries to take concrete steps to rid mankind of the nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over it.

In coming out for a radical solution involving a permanent ban on nuclear weapons with their removal from national arsenals along with a simultaneous ban on the employment of force generally, the Soviet Union at the same time considers it necessary to take selective measures capable of limiting the nuclear arms race and one after another to close off the channels through which they are deployed. A /complete and universal halt to the testing of nuclear weapons/ is of primary importance among them. Conclusion of a treaty on this score would mean that no country would conduct any more test explosions of nuclear weapons and, accordingly, that it would be impossible to improve or redevelop any kind of nuclear weapon.

The Soviet Union's constructive approach has made it possible to move ahead on a number of issues of essential importance for such a treaty. As was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, "much progress has been made in negotiations with the US and England toward a total ban on nuclear weapons tests." But in contrast to the constructive line taken by the Soviet Union, the position adopted by the United States of America and Great Britain has of late been characterized by increasing inconsistency. The numerous zigzags in the line followed by the Western partners is the main reason the negotiations have been prolonged.

The 35th session of the UN General Assembly has come out categorically in support of the Soviet Union's appeal for the earliest possible conclusion of an international

treaty providing for a complete and universal ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and declared in favor of assigning this issue top priority in a program of measures to limit the nuclear arms race.

The Soviet Union attaches prime importance for reducing the threat of nuclear war to /halting any further growth in national strategic nuclear arsenals followed by a steady quantitative reduction and qualitative limitations on strategic nuclear weapon systems./ The state of affairs in this area, which touches the very bases of the military strength of the USSR and the US, the two strongest military powers, impacts most directly not only on Soviet-American relations, but upon the international situation as a whole and other negotiations to limit the arms race as well.

The first agreements of this type between the USSR and the US, which were signed in Moscow in 1972, the Treaty Limiting Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1), reflected the balance of strategic forces of the USSR and the US and placed certain obstacles in the path of an intensification of their nuclear confrontation.

The Treaty Between the USSR and USA Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2), which was signed after many years of high-level efforts in Vienna on 18 June 1979, was to be the next major step in this direction. The nations expected that as soon as the SALT-2 treaty went into force negotiations would be started further to limit and reduce strategic weapons. But the SALT-2 treaty has still not gone into effect through the fault of the United States of America.

The Soviet Union has consistently advocated restraint with respect to strategic arms. It is as heretofore prepared to participate in the process of limiting and reducing these weapons with strict adherence to the principle of parity and equal security. "The limitation of strategic weapons and then their reduction," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared at the 26th CPSU Congress, "is an extraordinary problem. /We for our part are prepared without delay to continue appropriate negotiations with the US with the preservation of everything positive hitherto accomplished in this respect./ These negotiations, of course, can be conducted only on a basis of parity and equal security. We will not enter into any agreement which would give the US a one-sided advantage. There should be no illusions on this score. In our view, all other nuclear powers should at the appropriate time be brought into these negotiations as well."

It was declared from the platform of the congress that the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate a limitation on the deployment of new submarines, of the US Ohio class and similar ones of the USSR, and a prohibition of the modernization of ballistic missiles currently carried by these submarines as well as of the development of new ones.

The Soviet Union considers /prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons on our planet/ a major long-term task entailed in removing the threat of nuclear war. Nonproliferation and halting the nuclear arms race are two aspects of the problem of removing the nuclear threat. If the nuclear arms race represents the quantitative and qualitative sides of the problem, nonproliferation touches upon its spatial aspect. It comes as no coincidence that the tasks of halting the nuclear arms race and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons over the planet are considered as of equal importance in the summary report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress.

The Soviet Union was one of the main initiators and participants in the work involved in drawing up the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. One hundred

thirteen states have adhered to this treaty since it entered into force in 1970, and it has provided a basis for an international regime of nuclear weapons nonproliferation. A number of countries, however, have declined to adhere to the treaty; and such countries as the Republic of South Africa, Israel and Pakistan, rejecting the appeal of a majority of the countries of the world, are openly pursuing a course toward development of nuclear weapons. Making this problem especially acute is the accelerated process by which an increasing number of countries are developing a scientific-technical and industrial nuclear potential, particularly the rapid development of nuclear power and international trade in nuclear materials, facilities and technology.

The USSR is a convinced advocate of the establishment of effective monitoring of nuclear exports, including deliveries not only of nuclear materials and facilities but of nuclear technology as well. We are in favor of the application of the strictest guarantees so that international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of atomic energy will not become a conduit for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

One important measure, implementation of which would without doubt reduce the threat of nuclear war and help strengthen the nonproliferation regime, a measure proposed by the USSR, would be the /conclusion of an international convention strengthening guarantees of the security of nonnuclear countries./ The USSR has declared officially that it will never employ nuclear weapons against countries renouncing the production and acquisition of these weapons and which do not have them on their territory.

The Soviet Union proposes immediate resolution of the issue of the /nondeployment of nuclear weapons in those countries where they are not now deployed./ Conclusion of an agreement like this would be an important step toward restraining the nuclear arms race and reduce the danger of war. The basis of the proposed understanding would be a clear and simple obligation on the part of the nuclear powers not to deploy nuclear weapons in countries where they are not currently deployed regardless of whether these countries stand in an alliance relationship with one nuclear power or another.

Our country has also taken the initiative in putting forward the idea of the /establishment of nuclear-free zones/, an idea it proposed as early as the mid-1950s and one which it has since continued vigorously to advocate. The USSR looks upon the creation of such zones as one of the measures which would strengthen the regime of nuclear weapons nonproliferation, reduce the threat of nuclear war and relax regional military tensions.

Following its basic line, the USSR in 1978 signed and ratified Supplementary Protocol II of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The CPSU Central Committee's summary report to the 26th Party Congress once again expressed our country's support for the proposal to declare Africa and the Near East nuclear-free zones along with Latin America. The Soviet Union also declares its readiness to participate in a constructive discussion of proposals for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and together with other nuclear powers to act as a guarantor of its status if countries potentially adhering to such an agreement express their interest in one.

The overwhelming majority of UN member countries continually express themselves in favor of the establishment of nuclear-free zones and adopt General Assembly resolutions to this effect. But this problem remains unresolved.

A Ban on Weapons of Mass Destruction

The nuclear arms race is not all that threatens mankind with war. The employment of other types of weapons of mass destruction, weapons of great destructive force, may also have catastrophic consequences. That is why the USSR is a firm advocate of a ban or limitation on these means of waging war as well.

As early as the beginning of the 1970's, the Soviet Union in close cooperation with a number of other countries put forward the proposal for conclusion of an international convention /banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of reserve stocks of such weapons./ It is engaged in negotiations on this issue on a bilateral basis with the US and participating in discussions of this subject in the Committee on Disarmament. Negotiations with the US have made substantial progress to date. Basic agreement has been reached that a future convention banning chemical weapons should, as the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have proposed from the very beginning, pursue the objectives of a complete ban on the development, production and buildup of all types of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons. The USSR and US have agreed that compliance with the provisions of this convention should be subject to adequate verification. The parties have also reached agreement on a number of specific issues associated with a declaration of each country's stockpiles of chemical weapons and their means of production and then with their destruction. But negotiations to remove chemical weapons from national arsenals--and this was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress--are proceeding intolerably slowly.

The Soviet Union is convinced that on the basis of the serious work already accomplished these negotiations can quickly be brought to a successful conclusion. The monitoring problem need be no stumbling block. It can be successfully solved by the employment of national means of verification along with well-planned international procedures.

Our country has consistently come out in favor of making it entirely impossible to replenish national arsenals /with new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction./ As early as 1975 the Soviet Union was proposing the conclusion of a /comprehensive agreement/ banning the development and production of new types and systems of such weapons and putting forward a draft agreement, which was then supplemented in 1977. This draft contains provisions banning new means of mass destruction; it binds signatory countries not to develop or produce new types or systems of such weapons and establishes a procedure for verifying compliance with provisions of the agreement through consultations and the involvement of the UN Security Council.

While coming out for a comprehensive ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union is at the same time prepared to negotiate individual agreements banning specific new types of such weapons. The USSR has done everything possible in this connection to draw up jointly with the US a draft treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of /radiological weapons/, that is, weapons destroying living organisms with radioactive radiation produced by the nonexplosive disintegration of radioactive material. The CPSU Central Committee's summary report to the 26th Party Congress included preliminary agreement on basic provisions of a treaty banning radiological weapons among positive factors. This draft treaty is now under consideration in the Committee on Disarmament. The USSR sees no reason for work on the draft treaty not to be completed in the immediate future. Together with the Convention Banning Bacteriological Weapons, conclusion of this treaty would constitute a substantial step forward in the disarmament process and be of great political importance as a stimulus to further concrete measures limiting the arms race.

The Soviet Union proposes urgent measures to prevent the development and deployment of /neutron weapons/, which are a particularly cruel type of weapon of mass destruction.

We on the Soviet side have declared that the USSR will not proceed with the production of neutron weapons if the United States does not take this step. This remains our position. The USSR has always believed that the best solution would be to ban neutron weapons by treaty and on an international scale. From the platform of the 26th Party

Congress Comrade L. I. Brezhnev once again declared that we will not begin production of neutron weapons if they do not make their appearance in the arsenals of other countries and are prepared to conclude an agreement banning this weapon once and for all.

Curb the Arms Race on the Regional Level

Within the context of measures to halt the arms race and disarm on a regional level the Soviet Union attaches particular importance to /Europe/, which has in the past been the detonator of two world wars taking 65 million human lives and remains today a concentration of troops and military hardware exceeding 20-fold the average level worldwide.

An important path to solution of the problem of the relaxation of military tensions and disarmament on the European continent was marked out by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe convened upon the initiative of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

In accordance with the Final Act of this conference, all participating states assumed the obligation by all possible means to promote the process of detente and to work for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international supervision. The decisions of the general European conference were in fact directed toward making the whole of Europe a zone of peace.

The all-Europe conference also discussed and positively resolved the question of confidence-building measures. Put into effect for the first time on an international legal basis have been such confidence-building measures as prior announcement of military ground-training exercises and the invitation to them of observers from other countries. While not in the strict sense actions limiting the arms race, these measures nevertheless do serve the preventive ends of preventing the emergence of centers of military conflict and helping eliminate suspiciousness in connection with the military activities of different countries.

The agreements recorded in the Final Act of the all-European conference on confidence-building measures are now being put into effect. They are now in force on the territory of the countries of Europe including a 250-kilometer-wide zone of the USSR along its western border. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries have declared their readiness to go farther--to announce large military exercises conducted within the area defined by the Final Act not from the level of 25,000 men, but from the level of 20,000 men and not for three weeks, but for a month; to announce ground-force movements involving 20,000 or more men; to announce large air exercises within this region and major naval exercises conducted by some countries participating in the all-European conference in the vicinity of the territorial waters of others and to limit the scale of military exercises to the level of 40-50,000 personnel.

The CPSU Central Committee's summary report to the 26th Party Congress also put forward an important new proposal concerning confidence-building measures--a proposal to expand the zone of application of these measures. /"We are prepared,"/ Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared, /"to extend them to the entire European part of the USSR--provided the Western countries correspondingly expand their zone of confidence-building measures."/ In this connection the Soviet Union considers the US and Canada participants in the Helsinki agreements along with the European countries. It is therefore necessary for all participating countries to assume equivalent obligations in connection with the relaxation of military tension and disarmament in Europe. There should be no privileges here for individual countries whose armed forces constitute part of the general equation of the balance of military forces in Europe.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have consistently come out for continuity in the process of detente set in motion by the all-European conference and for effective steps to relax military tension on the continent of Europe. Special importance is to be attached in this connection to the /convocation of a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe/ as an essential component of the development of a general European process leading to a consolidation and strengthening of security on the continent.

The issue of the convocation of such a conference has now moved onto the practical plane. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries see as entirely realistic a decision in Madrid in favor of calling a conference on military detente and disarmament. This requires only one thing--political will and a sense of responsibility for the fate of peace in Europe on the part of all participants in the meeting.

Another important path to military detente and disarmament is to be found in /mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in the central part of the European continent/, which occupies a key position from a strategic point of view because it possesses a highly developed system of all means of transport and communication connecting it with practically all other countries and regions of Europe as well as with the rest of the world. A military conflict in central Europe could easily engulf every other part of the continent, especially if we consider the range of today's nuclear and conventional weapons.

From the very beginning of the negotiations on this issue in Vienna the Soviet Union, in close cooperation with other socialist countries sought to give them a businesslike, purposeful character and to make possible the drawing up and conclusion of an effective agreement mutually reducing armed forces and arms in Central Europe. The compromise proposals put forward by the USSR and its allies in 1980 open up realistic short-term prospects for the conclusion of a first-stage agreement providing for reduction of ground forces and arms in central Europe on the part of the USSR and the US and for "freezing" the strength of the armed forces in this region of other direct participants in the negotiations. These peace initiatives have been backed up by practical steps. The Soviet Union's unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 military personnel, 1,000 tanks and other military equipment from GDR territory can serve as a dramatic example.

But the NATO countries obstinately refuse to go for mutual reduction of forces and arms in Europe, a position dictated by their general policy of intensifying military preparations. By sidestepping the key issues involved in the negotiations and avoiding any constructive response to the proposals put forward by the socialist countries, the West is seeking to shift in its favor the balance of military forces in the center of the European continent. For more than six years now the West has refused to accept even such a simple, straightforward proposal as that calling for a cap on troop strength on the part of all participants for the period during which negotiations are under way. We might ask those enthusiastically conjuring the myth of the so-called "Soviet threat" just who in fact it is that has an interest in creating a military threat, from whose side might we anticipate one. If the NATO countries continue to drag out the Vienna negotiations while at the same time increasing their military potential in Europe, then as stated in the CPSU Central Committee summary report, we will have to take this fact into consideration.

In the view of the USSR, the present world situation requires greater efforts, to include those made within the context of the Vienna negotiations as well, to remove the threat of war and strengthen international security.

In consequence of NATO's dangerous moves to undermine the military balance in Europe, the question of /nuclear weapons on this continent/ has lately become particularly

acute. In 1979 the Soviet Union declared its readiness to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in the western regions of the USSR if no more such weapons were deployed in Western Europe. The refusal of the US and its allies to accept this proposal and NATO's decision to produce and deploy new American medium-range missiles in a number of West European countries have understandably seriously complicated the situation in Europe.

A year later, in 1980, the Soviet Union, guided by the interests of peace and security, put forward a new proposal--to discuss simultaneously and in organic relation to one another the issues concerning both medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and forward-based American nuclear weapons. It is to be borne in mind in this regard that any possible agreements on these issues may be realized in practice only after implementation of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2). This proposal was submitted for discussion during the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, the first round of which was held in October-November 1980. An important new proposal was put forward at the 26th CPSU Congress. /"We propose,"/ Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared, /"that negotiations be opened to establish an immediate moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles by both the NATO countries and the USSR, that is, to freeze these weapons at their current level both quantitatively and qualitatively, including, of course, US forward-based nuclear weapons in this region."/

Thanks to the vigorous and persistent efforts of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries during recent years we have not only marked out the paths leading to military detente and disarmament in Europe but have also begun to move in the direction of the agreed-upon goals. No few difficulties lie ahead, of course. It is therefore exceptionally important that movement in all areas toward relaxation of military tension and disarmament in Europe not be interrupted, that it be continuously accelerated and that it become increasingly efficient.

Also becoming a problem of great urgency in recent years has been that of /strengthening security and relaxing military tension in the Indian Ocean region/, along the shores of which live peoples who have liberated themselves from colonial domination. Their right to a peaceful, tranquil life and their desire to concentrate their efforts and resources on the economic and social development of their countries have been called into question by the sharply increased military presence and military activity of the US and some of its allies in the Indian Ocean region, particularly by the establishment of military bases there, among them the large US naval and air force base on the island of Diego Garcia.

The Soviet Union is striving consistently to relieve tensions in the Indian Ocean, to eliminate any manifestations of an arms race in this region and to extend the process of detente throughout this area as well. The real way to achieve this end is to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace in accordance with the proposal of the littoral states and the UN declaration. In the view of the USSR, /transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace/ requires, first of all, a solution of the problem of limiting and reducing the level of the military presence and military activity of the littoral states in the region of the world, the removal from the area of all foreign military bases without exception and preventing the Indian Ocean from being transformed into a launching pad for nuclear missiles and for an imperialist diktat imposed upon the peoples in this part of the world.

The Soviet Union supports the UN decision to hold an international conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo (Sri Lanka) in 1981. It is participating actively in preparations for the conference and is ready to cooperate with other countries in transforming

the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. In the view of the Soviet Union, considering the current state of affairs the convocation of this conference is becoming an increasingly urgent matter.

Bearing heavily upon the problem of strengthening security and relaxing tension in the Indian Ocean is that of /preserving peace in the Persian Gulf./

Under the pretext of securing its sea lanes, the US military machine is actively working its way into the Persian Gulf and preparing for a prolonged period of deployment there. The increasing American military presence here runs contrary to the will of the peoples of this region, generates tension and creates the threat of dangerous military conflicts.

References by the US and its allies to the need to insure the security of their flow of oil through the Indian Ocean are completely groundless. The security of sea lanes can be insured by reducing, not increasing, the level of military presence. This constitutes the basis for the proposals Comrade L. I. Brezhnev put forward in Delhi on 10 December 1980 concerning measures to stabilize the situation in the Persian Gulf region and maintain the security of the sea lanes passing through it.

The Soviet Union proposes negotiations with the US and other Western countries, China, Japan and all countries demonstrating an interest in the matter on commitments, which would contribute to the elimination of sources of tension and the military danger in the Persian Gulf region, not to establish foreign military bases there, not to resort to threats to employ force, not to deploy nuclear weapons of mass destruction or any other kind of weapons and to respect the sovereignty of the states of the region and the nonaligned status they have chosen. It has also been proposed that mutual obligations be assumed not to create any obstacles or threats to normal trade or to the use of the sea lanes linking the countries of this region to those in other parts of the world.

Explaining Soviet proposals dealing with the problem of /effective means of maintaining peace in the Persian Gulf region and in the approaches to it/, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared at the 26th CPSU Congress: "Instead of assembling more and more naval and air fleets there and pouring in increasing numbers of troops and weapons, we are proposing that the military threat be removed there with the conclusion of an international agreement. Through joint efforts and consideration for the legitimate interests of all parties it will be possible to create a stable and peaceful situation in this region. It will be possible to guarantee the sovereign rights of the countries in the region as well as the security of the sea and other lines of communication linking it with the rest of the world. This is what the proposals recently put forward by the Soviet Union purport to accomplish."

The Soviet initiative has received widespread support throughout the world, including among a number of countries in the Persian Gulf. It met, however, with a negative reaction on the part of the governments of the US and the other NATO countries. The hope was expressed at the 26th CPSU Congress that "they would think this whole matter over calmly and without preconceptions so that together we might search for a solution acceptable to all."

In an effort to add new momentum to solution of the problem of stabilizing the situation in the Persian Gulf region, the 26th CPSU Congress introduced important new proposals in addition to those already put forward. In response to statements that these proposals could not be separated from the question of the presence of the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared: /"We would not object

to discussing matters connected with Afghanistan in conjunction with the problems of security in the Persian Gulf./ Such discussions could, of course, consider only the international aspects of the Afghan problem and not internal Afghan affairs. The sovereignty of Afghanistan must be fully maintained as well as its status as a nonaligned country."

Recent events have again confirmed the pressing importance of taking effective steps to reduce the military danger in the Persian Gulf region.

The Soviet Union--and this was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress--supports the idea of making /Southeast Asia a zone of peace/ as proposed by countries of the region.

Finally in connection with the /Far East/, where such powers as the USSR, the US and Japan find themselves neighbors and American military bases are located, the Soviet Union proposes the opening of concrete negotiations on steps to build confidence among all interested countries. As was stated in the CPSU Central Committee's summary report to the 26th Party Congress, "the negotiation and implementation of confidence-building measures in this region, taking its particular characteristics into account, of course, could not only relax tension in the immediate area but also be a highly beneficial contribution to the strengthening of the foundations of universal peace."

Soviet proposals for curbing the arms race on a regional level point to concrete, workable means of stabilizing the situation and averting crises in different dangerously explosive parts of the world.

The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that for no nation on the planet is there today a matter more essential, more critical than maintaining the peace and securing the most fundamental right of every human being--the right to life. With the mobilization of sufficient will and energy by peaceloving forces, and with these forces solidly united, it will be possible to maintain and strengthen the peace and to preserve and multiply the fruits of detente.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

SOVIET COMMENTS ON CHINA'S NAVAL CAPABILITIES

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 81 (signed to press 6 Apr 81) pp 63-68

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Kozhin and Captain 1st Rank I. Vasin, candidate of military science: "The Chinese Navy"]

[Text] In pursuing its policy of the militarization of China and establishment of its hegemony throughout the world, the Beijing leadership considers its armed forces, of which the Navy is an independent branch, as the basic means for achieving these aggressive aims. The Navy was established at the end of 1950 and by now, foreign military specialists believe, is among the largest in Asia.

According to the Western and Chinese press, the Chinese Navy has the following main missions: combat enemy naval forces, support ground forces operating in coastal sectors, defend the coast against landings in coordination with the other branches of the armed forces, protect sea lines of communications and in addition, conduct reconnaissance, carry out amphibious landings and participate in realizing plans for expansion on the sea. The Chinese seizure of the Paracel Islands (January 1974) marked the beginning of the practical utilization of the Navy to realize Beijing's territorial claims, including in the South China Sea where large oil reserves were discovered.

The chief of the Navy is also a deputy defense minister. He is responsible for the status and development of the Navy, organization and conduct of operational and combat training of ships, units, formations and staffs, recruiting and ideological influencing of personnel, supply of arms, and for construction and defense of military coastal facilities. The commissar heading the Navy's political directorate is equally responsible for the activity of the Navy and its combat readiness and personnel morale and psychological state.

The Chinese Navy has three fleets (the Northern, Eastern and Southern), naval aviation and coast artillery.

Organizationally, the fleets consist of submarines and surface ships (cutters), naval bases and naval regions. Each fleet has its own zone of operations, within the bounds of which it carries out daily activity, organizes its protection and organizes the defense of the offshore islands and coastal facilities. Thus, the Northern Fleet (Qingdao is the main naval base) is assigned the waters of the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Gulf; the Eastern Fleet (Shanghai) has the East China Sea

and the strait zones connecting it with the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean; the Southern Fleet (Zhanjiang) is assigned the South China Sea, Gulf of Tonkin and the outlets to the adjacent seas.

Judging by the data of the reference MILITARY BALANCE, the Chinese Navy has under 250 combat ships of the main classes, about 800 combat cutters and over 100 auxiliary ships for various purposes that are distributed between the three fleets. A considerable number of them are of American, Japanese, British, Canadian and Australian construction from the period of the forties to the sixties. In design, they are obsolete, have substantially exhausted their service life and are in need of modernization, and a certain number are to be withdrawn from use in the next decade.

The fleet's nucleus and main strike force, according to the estimate of foreign military specialists, consists of the submarines (86 ships). The most modern of them are considered the two nuclear torpedo "Han" type. The rest are diesels, the majority of which were built according to foreign designs of the fifties to sixties. They are obsolete and do not fully meet the requirements imposed on this class of warships.

The "Ming" type (two) diesel submarines and the nuclear ones are of native Chinese design and construction. According to the foreign press, the "Ming" type ships were placed into operation in the years 1974 to 1975. Their surface displacement is 1,500 t and submerged is 1,900 t; length is about 76 m; armament is six 533-mm torpedo tubes. The crew numbers 75. The nuclear ships were built, judging by the reference JANE'S, in the years 1974 to 1977.

The Chinese command is paying much attention to the development and construction of submarines of their own design that would be close to modern models. The appearance in China of the first nuclear ships of national construction is evaluated by foreign military specialists as a serious step on the path to raising the combat capabilities of its fleet.

The Chinese surface navy consists of URO [guided-missile] destroyers, guided-missile frigates, frigates, escorts, ASW ships, landing ships and minesweepers.

The guided-missile destroyer class (12 ships) includes the "Luda" type (8, fig. 1 [not reproduced]) of domestic development and the "Angshang" type (4) of foreign construction in the forties, modernized and reequipped by the Chinese at the beginning of the seventies. The "Luda" destroyers were put into operation in the seventies. Their total displacement is 3,750 t; length is 131 m; width is 13.7 m; draft is 4.6 m; top speed is 30 knots; armament: two three-container PU [launchers] for PKR [antiship missiles], two 130-mm, four 57-mm and four 25-mm twin guns, and two depth-charge throwers. The crew numbers 200.

Guided-missile frigates (11): five "Jianghu" type ships and two "Jiangdong", built in the second half of the seventies from Chinese designs, as well as four frigates assembled in the fifties from assemblies and sections supplied from abroad and reequipped into guided-missile ships in 1971.

The "Jianghu" and "Jiangdong" guided-missile frigates have a total displacement of 2,200 t; length 103 m; width 12 m; draft 4 m; speed up to 28 knots; armament: guided missile system (on the "Jianghu") or SAM's (on the "Jiangdong"), 100-mm twin gun, four 37-mm twin guns, four depth-charge throwers.

Frigates: five "Jiangnan" ships constructed in the years 1967 to 1969. Their total displacement is 1,600 t; length 90.8 m; width 10 m; draft 3.9 m; top speed 28 knots; armament: three 100-mm guns, four 37-mm twin guns, two 12.7-mm coaxial machineguns, six depth-charge throwers (including two rocket launchers), and two bomb release slips. The crew numbers 175.

As the foreign press reports, in the escort and ASW ship class, there are 12 escorts of foreign construction from the forties to the fifties, including Japanese (the types "Nanchang," "Hueian," "Changbai," "Wuchang" and "Shenyang"), Canadian ("Guanzhou"), British ("Kaifin") and Australian ("Zhongxing"), as well as 45 ASW ships (24 of Chinese construction of the "Hainan" type and 21 of foreign production). The "Hainan" type ships have a standard displacement of 360 t, length of 60 m, and speed of 24 knots. They have gun and ASW armament.

The most numerous class of ships in the Chinese Navy, according to the reference MILITARY BALANCE, are the missile, torpedo and patrol ships (about 800 ships) intended to counter surface ships and landings of an enemy, as well as for patrolling coastal waters. The greater part of these ships are of foreign production (delivered in the sixties), and the rest were built in China based on foreign designs ("Svetaou" type) or domestic design. Built in national shipyards are PT boats with hydrofoils of the "Huchuan" type (displacement 37 t, length about 22 m, speed 50 knots) and the patrol ships "Shanghai-1" and "Shanghai-2" (displacement, respectively, 100 and 120 t, length 36.6 and 38.8 m, speed up to 30 knots).

All the landing ships are mainly of foreign construction. Included among them are the former American tank landing ships of the types LST (15) and LSM (15), as well as landing ships (11) built in the forties. Installed on some are gun systems of various calibers and models, and on others, launchers for NUR [unguided missiles] and minelaying facilities. Several "Yulin" type tank landing ships with a displacement of 1,500 t, as well as the "Yunnan" type landing ships (300) with a displacement of 300 t have now been constructed from Chinese designs.

Besides these landing ships, the Chinese command has the capability of also using a considerable number of junks and ships for coastal and river duty.

The fleet's minesweeping forces include 37 basic minesweepers (20 "Fushun" type of domestic design and 17 of national construction based on foreign models) and up to 100 auxiliary minesweepers reequipped from fishing trawlers and other ships. The ships are armed with guns, depth-charge throwers and various types of sweeps.

The navy's auxiliary forces include over 100 ships of various classes. Among them are floating bases for submarines and PT boats, dry-cargo transports, tankers, rescue ships and tugs for various functions. The main part of the auxiliary ships are of foreign construction.

Naval aviation was established in 1952 based on foreign aircraft. Gradually improving, it has now been transformed into a major naval arm capable of carrying out missions in the interests of the fleet.

According to the reference MILITARY BALANCE, the Chinese naval airforce has over 800 combat and auxiliary aircraft and helicopters grouped into three bomber (mine-torpedo) and six fighter air divisions, separate units and subunits. The main organized combat unit is the squadron.

The bomb (mine-torpedo) divisions have torpedo and mine carrying aircraft (over 100). The fighter divisions have the F-4, F-6, F-7 and F-9 fighters (about 550). Reconnaissance aviation has no more than 20 obsolete aircraft. Auxiliary aviation subunits include trainers and transports as well as liaison aircraft and helicopters.

A large part of the naval aviation fleet was manufactured abroad in the fifties and sixties, and the rest are modified models of national production of recent years. All aircraft and helicopters are shore based. According to the estimate of Western military specialists, naval aviation, even though it has a considerable fleet of aircraft and an impressive combat composition, has limited capabilities for supporting naval forces and combatting enemy submarine and surface forces, especially at distant approaches.

Coastal artillery has existed in the Navy since its organization. The long extent of the coasts, and the presence of a considerable number of convenient harbors, naval bases, ports and other facilities on the coast predetermined the need for this arm. The basis of the coastal artillery, according to the reference JANE'S, are artillery battalions and regiments as well as separate batteries. They have guns of various calibers (from 76.2 to 180 mm) and a small number of shore-to-ship missiles. The coastal artillery guns were made by the Chinese largely from foreign models,

Judging by the foreign press, the Chinese Navy also has antiaircraft artillery subunits and units intended to establish air defense systems for harbors, ships and staff bases, major ports and other facilities. They have antiaircraft guns (from 37-mm to 85-mm) of domestic and foreign manufacture.

The coastal and antiaircraft artillery subunits and units are distributed between the naval regions. As a rule, they are positioned close to major and important facilities on shore, supplying their defense, and they also cover strait zones and offshore islands located within the effective range of fire. In executing their missions, naval coastal artillery coordinates closely with the ground force field and antiaircraft artillery positioned in coastal areas.

According to the reference MILITARY BALANCE, the Chinese Navy has 360,000 men, including 30,000 in naval aviation and 28,000 in coastal and antiaircraft artillery.

Naval personnel recruitment is based on the "Decree on Questions of Military Service" of 1978, by which the system of combining military obligation with recruitment of volunteers was introduced. Under this system, all male citizens between the ages of 18 to 49 have a military obligation. The length of active duty in the Navy is 5 years, and for voluntary enlistment it is 15 to 20 years. A considerable number of the junior commanders and specialists are serving voluntarily beyond the

required period. Mid-level commanders are primarily graduates of military schools and academies and higher civilian institutions who have gone through military training in special schools.

Senior and top-level commanders are replaced with people who have extensive practical naval service and have completed the Naval Academy or short-term academic courses.

The Chinese Navy has a rather elaborate system of military training institutions that basically supply the needs for command cadres. Among the most well-known institutions, according to the reference JANE'S, are: the Naval Academy, established in 1950 (Dalyan), the Military Academy (Nanking), the School of Coastal Artillery, Radio Specialists and Rear Support (Shanghai), the Naval Air Academy (Shanghai and Qingdao), and the Submarine Schools (Lushao, Yulin and Qingdao).

Military Training. Judging by the American journal PROCEEDINGS, in recent years the Chinese command has stepped up activity to improve the combat training of naval units and formations. Joint exercises with the different naval arms have been held, and naval exercises have been held in the South China Sea. During them, special attention was paid to the questions of organization and control of operations by ship formations, coordination of the naval arms and the Navy as a whole with other branches of the armed forces, and to practicing the missions of combatting enemy submarines and surface ships, supply of materials and equipment to ships at sea (fig. 2 [not reproduced]) and others.

Prospects for Development. As the reference JANE'S reports, further development of the Chinese Navy presupposes increasing its strike power through placing new types of warships and aircraft into service (primarily, nuclear submarines, destroyers with guided missiles, guided-missile frigates and missile ships) and equipping them with modern armament. Much importance is also attached to modernizing ships, obsolete models of weapons and combat equipment both through domestic capabilities and with the assistance of Western countries. Having decided to expand cooperation with the imperialist states, the Chinese are counting on obtaining from them models of modern systems of naval armaments, communications and navigation equipment, and advanced technology to modernize their Navy. However, for the time being, Beijing's efforts in this direction have not met success, and as foreign military specialists note, China will have to rely on its own resources and capabilities now. Therefore, in their opinion, in the near future, one should hardly expect any significant buildup in ships in the Chinese fleet or substantial increase in combat capabilities of the naval forces as a whole.

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